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Dissertation
ABSTRACT
From economic point of view, there are two main reasons to study gambling mar-
kets. First, gambling markets today are a major entertainment industry. Second, 
they offer an authentic environment to research how markets work in general 
and how people behave under risk. This dissertation is a study on bettors’ be-
haviour in gambling markets. More specifically, we empirically test theoretical 
assumptions and the market efficiency hypotheses. Chapter 1 is an introduction 
to the economics of decision making under risk. Chapter 2 is a description of the 
gambler’s utility and the price of gambling. We propose a model where typical 
gambling behaviour (e.g. betting on horse races) is modelled with the utility of 
risk, subjective probability, and the utility of money. Chapter 3 empirically analy-
ses market efficiency in betting on Finnish harness horse races. The results imply 
that the markets are weakly efficient but characterised by the favourite-longshot 
bias. Chapter 4 is an empirical study based on the theoretical models of expected 
utility theory and non-expected utility theories. We test the models by using 
Finnish harness horse racing data. Our empirical results suggest that bettors are 
risk-averse, but they also have unrealistic views regarding winning probabilities. 
Chapter 5 empirically analyses gambling markets data in the context of the re-
sults of experimental economics. We show that the Allais Paradox and gambling 
behaviour are related to each other.
Key words: Gambling markets, Expected utility theory, Rank-dependent utility, 
Favourite-longshot bias
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Väitöskirja
ABSTRAkTi
Talousteorian kannalta on kaksi pääsyytä tutkia rahapelimarkkinoita. Ensiksi, 
pelimarkkinat ovat suuri viihdeteollisuuden muoto. Toiseksi, pelimarkkinoiden 
tutkimus tarjoaa mainion reaalimaailman tutkimuskentän riskikäyttäytymisen 
tarkasteluun sekä eri riskiteorioiden testaamiseen ja vertailuun. Tässä väitöskir-
jassa tarkastellaan ihmisten riskinalaista päätöksentekoa rahapelien viitekehyk-
sessä. Tutkimuksissa testataan empiirisesti talousteoreettisten mallien oletuksia. 
Ensimmäinen luku on katsaus riskinalaisiin päätösteorioihin. Toinen luku on 
kuvaus rahapelaajien käyttäytymisestä, pelaamisesta saatavasta hyödystä ja ra-
hapelin hinnan määräytymisestä. Kolmas luku käsittelee empiirisesti markki-
noiden tehokkuutta Suomen ravipelimarkkinoilla. Tulosten mukaan markkinat 
ovat pääosin tehokkaat, mutta pelaajat sijoittavat yllättäjiin enemmän kuin olisi 
odotusarvon mukaisesti kannattavaa (ns. yllättäjän harha). Neljäs luku testaa 
empiirisesti odotetun hyödyn ja vaihtoehtoisen ns. ei-odotetun hyödyn mallien 
oletuksia Suomen ravipeliaineistolla. Tulokset viittaavat siihen, että pelaajat ovat 
riskinkaihtajia, mutta heidän subjektiiviset käsityksensä todennäköisyyksistä 
poikkeavat objektiivisista. Luvussa viisi analysoidaan pelaajien käyttäytymistä 
kokeellisen talousteorian viitekehyksessä. Tulosten mukaan pelaajien käyttäyty-
misellä ravipeleissä on yhteneväisyyksiä ns. Allaisin paradoksin kanssa.
Asiasanat: rahapelimarkkinat, odotetun hyödyn teoria, järjestyksestä riippuva 
odotetun hyödyn teoria, yllättäjän harha
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1  Introduction
Every day we have to make choices which include risk and uncertainty. Do we 
buy home insurance to cover damage due to fire? In which financial instrument, 
stocks or government bonds shall we invest our money? Is it a good bet to drive 
through red traffic lights? In fact, it is very hard to find an ordinary day when 
we do not need to make some risky or uncertain choices. But what does the word 
“risk” actually mean? The Oxford English Dictionary defines risk as “([e]xposure 
to) the possibility of loss, injury, or other adverse or unwelcome circumstance; a chance or 
situation involving such a possibility.” Thus, risk is the possibility of an event which 
is unavoidable or could be unpleasant. Generally, we try to avoid risk, i.e. we are 
risk-averse. On the other hand, if we choose the risky option and the unpleasant 
event does not occur, we will usually be rewarded (e.g. we save money or time). 
Hence, we try to estimate the probabilities of expected losses and choose an op-
tion, risky or less risky, whichever is best for us.
One target of decision making theories is to model how individuals behave 
under risk and uncertainty. This modelling is based on two critical concepts: 
probabilities and outcomes. Basically, it means that modelling individuals’ behav-
iour, in a general sense, very closely resembles decisions in the context of gam-
bling. That is, decision-makers win and/or lose some amount of money (outcome) 
with a given probability. In this dissertation we study decision making under risk 
from the perspective of gambling markets.
Why gambling? It seems that gambling is a part of human nature. The classi-
cal legend tells us that Zeus, Hades and Poseidon split the Universe up by shar-
ing heaven, hell and the sea by a throw of the dice. Also, it has been claimed 
that the Roman soldiers cast lots for the garments of Christ after His crucifixion. 
In the context of probability theory, gambling has played a significant role. The 
mathematicians Fermat and Pascal (in their contribution) established the basic 
principles of probability. They considered the specific issues of odds calculation 
that had been presented to them by gamblers.1  In addition, from the economic 
point of view, there are two main reasons to study gambling markets. First, gam-
bling markets today are a major entertainment industry. Second, they offer an 
authentic environment to research how markets work in general and how people 
behave under risk.  
Traditionally, gambling markets offer opportunities to bet on sports events 
and horse racing, but also to play casino games (e.g. roulette and Black Jack) 
1 In 1654, the Chevalier De Mere, was puzzled by a popular dice game. The game consisted of throwing 
a pair of dice 24 times; the problem was to decide whether or not to bet even money on the occurrence 
of at least one “double six” during the 24 throws. A well-established gambling rule led De Mere to 
believe that betting on a double six in 24 throws would be profitable, but his own calculations based 
on many repetitions of the 24 throws indicated just the opposite.
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likewise various lotteries and slot machines. However, nowadays one can bet on 
almost anything2: for instance, who wins the elections or the Eurovision Song 
Contest. Since these markets are alive and well, there must also be demand. To 
shed some light on the scale of betting, we present some facts and figures on 
gambling markets in Finland. According to the Yearbook of Finnish Gambling 
2009, it is estimated that 87 per cent of people over 15 years of age have engaged 
in gambling at some point in their lives. Gambling therefore provides the majority 
of people with pleasure or entertainment, but at the same time it is estimated that 
about three per cent of population have had gambling problems during the last 12 
months3. To control adverse effects of gambling, the gambling markets in Finland 
are regulated by state-owned monopolies. There are three state-owned gambling 
companies: Veikkaus (lotteries, betting on sports events), RAY4 (slot machines, 
Casino games), and Fintoto (betting on horse racing). 
According to the statistics of the gambling companies, we know that turno-
vers increased in the period 2004-2008 (Yearbook of Finnish Gambling 2009). In 
total, the turnover in 2008 was almost 8.6 billion Euros. Thus the average amount 
of bets per person per year (over 15 years of age) in 2008 was almost 2,000 Euros. 
However, this does not tell us the right information on total spending on gam-
bling because very often we get back the amount of our bet (win) and bet it again. 
The actual amount of total spending is the companies’ profit before taxes and 
costs. That was 1.5 billion Euros in 2008. This amount indicates that the average 
amount of spending per person is about 330 Euros. Overall, it seems that people 
gamble and are prepared to pay for this enjoyment, but there are also some ad-
verse effects, such as gambling addiction. An understanding of the operation of 
markets and gamblers’ behaviour gives us a tool to analyse policy alternatives, 
undesired side effects, market regulation, and incentive designs.5
First, gambling is a puzzling phenomenon from the perspective of economic 
theory. Conventional decision theory assumes that people try to avoid risk, and 
they buy insurances, for instance. Hence, voluntary participation in activity that 
constitutes a risky situation with a negative expected value (such as betting) is not 
expected at all. However, gambling itself may not be wealth-oriented but instead 
motivated by the pleasure of gaming. Thus, from the perspective of entertain-
ment, game participation can be rationalized. This aspect of gambling is usually 
ignored in the economic literature. The topic is discussed in detail in Section 2.6. 
Second, bettors’ behaviour in gambling markets can be used as a test for dif-
ferent decision theories under risk and market efficiency. Usually, in betting mar-
kets there is a large number of gamblers with potential access to rich information 
sets, and each bet has a well-defined endpoint at which its value becomes certain. 
This gives us an opportunity to estimate econometrically the assumptions of de-
2 In fact, some betting firms offer the opportunity to bet on everything, e.g. when the first human be-
ing will land on Mars.
3 It is estimated that about a third of these people are pathological gamblers.
4 Actually, RAY (Finland’s Slot Machine Association) is not a company but an association of public 
utility. Veikkaus and Fintoto are limited companies owned by the state.
5 On the current development of gaming markets, see Virén (2008).
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cision making theories. Moreover, the information issues, like the hypothesis of 
market efficiency, can be tested by using the historical data of results.
This dissertation is a study on bettors’ behaviour in gambling markets. More 
specifically, we empirically test theoretical assumptions and the market efficiency 
hypotheses. The main contribution of the dissertation is the articles in Chapters 2 
to 5. Chapter 2 is a description of the gambler’s utility and the price of gambling. 
We propose a model where typical gambling behaviour (e.g. betting on horse 
races) is modelled with the utility of risk, subjective probability, and the utility 
of money. Chapter 3 empirically analyses market efficiency in Finnish betting on 
horse races. We also introduce a testing procedure which is based on the actual 
winning odds rather than commonly used probability estimates. Chapter 4 is an 
empirical study based on the theoretical models of expected utility theory and 
non-expected utility theories. We test the models by using Finnish harness horse 
racing data. Chapter 5 empirically analyses gambling markets data in the context 
of the results of experimental economics. We show that the Allais Paradox and 
gambling behaviour are related to each other.
The rest of the introductory chapter is organised as follows. First we review 
decision making theories under risk and uncertainty. In Section 3 we discuss 
market efficiency conditions from the perspective of gambling markets. Section 
4 presents a summary of articles.  
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2 Theories of Decision Making 
Under Risk and Uncertainty 
2.1 BACkgRouNd
The idea of the expected utility theory (from now on EUT) was first proposed by 
Daniel Bernoulli (1738). Bernoulli was puzzled by the problem of how much a 
rational individual is prepared to pay to take a gamble. The most common con-
ception was that gamblers could pay the expected monetary value of the gamble 
but nothing more. However, Bernoulli gave a following counterexample: suppose 
that we toss a coin repeatedly until we get heads. Our winning sum is 2n , where 
n is the number of throws until we get the first heads. As there is always a non-
zero probability that n can be very large the winning sum can increase infinitely.6 
This is the so-called St. Petersburg gamble or paradox. Bernoulli concluded that 
individuals are only prepared to pay a small amount of money for such a gamble. 
In other words, individuals change money bets for some kinds of “utilities”. 
Much later John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944) developed ex-
pected utility theory. This is also called von Neumann-Morgenstern EUT. The main 
aspects of EUT are the preferences and the axioms which determine decisions 
under risk and uncertainty. 7
2.2 expeCTed uTiliTy TheoRy
To comprehend the general idea of EUT, assume a consequence or an outcome of 
some action or choice which happens with some probability. These consequences, 
broadly speaking, may be death, illness, victory, etc. However, assume that the 
consequences are a list of measurable monetary values. These mutually exclusive 
consequences are associated with the probability distribution in which probabili-
ties are non-negative and add up to one. Now, the consequences and probabilities 
together present a vector which is called a prospect or gamble. Thus, the prospect is 
to be understood as a list of consequences with associated probabilities. 
Basically, EUT can be derived from three separate axioms with the monotonic-
6 Note that this only works if the amount of gambling cash is infinity.
7 Traditional decision theories distinguish between the concepts of risk and uncertainty. Decision 
making under risk means that the outcome probabilities are known, whereas in decision making 
under uncertainty these probabilities are unknown. However, most decisions are made in the middle 
field between known and unknown probabilities. Therefore, we do not distinguish between decisions 
under risk and uncertainty. 
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ity assumption: ordering, continuity, and independence8 (for more detail, see e.g. 
Starmer 2000). Now, assume that axioms, preferences over gambles, can be repre-
sented by a function which gives a real-valued index to each gamble. This function 
operates between prospects, such that an individual will choose the first gamble 
over the second gamble if and only if the value of the index of the first gamble is no 
less than the value of the index of the second gamble. We also assume that an in-
dividual maximizes the function index. In practice, this index can be calculated by 
taking the weighted average of the utility of outcomes, whereby the incorporated 
weights are precisely the true probabilities of receiving the corresponding out-
comes. This means that the utility function measures outcomes in a real-value and 
comparable form. We assume that the utility function is continuous, monotonous 
and at least twice differentiable. The shape of the utility function has behavioural 
interpretations: a concave utility function means risk aversion and linear utility 
function indicates risk-neutrality, whereby a convex function means risk-seeking.9 
In EUT we usually assume that individuals are risk-averse. This implies that 
an agent with concave utility function will always prefer a certain amount x  to 
any risky prospect with an expected value equal to x. Moreover, EUT considers 
risky decisions from the perspective of final states (which include asset position) 
rather than just gains or losses.
One application of EUT is subjective expected utility theory (SEUT), which is 
also called Bayesian decision theory. SEUT was first developed by Savage (1954). 
Savage obtained the basic ideas from Ramsey (1931), de Finet (1937), and von 
Neumann & Morgenstern (1944). EUT axioms and definitions also play an im-
portant role in SEUT. However, the main difference is that in EUT probabilities 
are based on objective verifiable information, whereas in SEUT a decision-maker 
perceives probabilities subjectively: an individual evaluates the probabilities of 
consequences a priori with his or her personal knowledge or beliefs and updates 
(posterior) his or her beliefs as a learning process.
For example, suppose that we ask an individual about the probability of a 
toss, when we flip an unbiased coin. At first, the gambler’s a priori estimate of 
the toss probability is 0.3. However, the gambler is a rational decision-maker and 
decides to conduct coin-flipping trials before answering. As the decision-maker 
has flipped the coin long enough, he or she notices that the posterior probability 
is closer to 0.5 than 0.3. Therefore the gambler decides to answer almost surely 
that the probability of the toss is 0.5. 
As regards a utility function, Savage (1954) pointed out that the function must 
be bounded at least from above. The reason is simple: if the function was not 
bounded, the St. Petersburg paradox would not vanish. Furthermore, Savage (1954) 
left open the possibility that utility as a function of wealth may not be concave, at 
least in some intervals of wealth. The possibility of non-concave segments of the 
utility function is also found in Markowitz (1952), and in Friedman & Savage (1948).
8 The ordering axiom includes both completeness and transitivity. Note that when we discuss indi-
vidual rationality, we imply that an individual behaves according to the above axioms.
9 In the context of gambling markets, we have to assume convex utility function, i.e. risk-seeking 
behaviour. 
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2.3 CRiTiCiSm of expeCTed uTiliTy TheoRy
EUT has come in for harsh criticism since the early 1950s. Often the criticism has 
been motivated by experiments, where it has been observed that decision-makers 
systematically behave against predictions of EUT. 
The Allais Paradox. The possibly most famous paradox was introduced by 
Maurice Allais (1953). It can be presented as follows. First imagine choosing be-
tween two prospects: The first option (s1) is sure to yield one million. The second 
(r1) will yield five million with a probability 0.1, one million with a probability 
0.89, and nothing with a probability 0.01. After the first decision, with the same 
logic, you choose between another two prospects. Now first option (s2) gives one 
million with the probability 0.11 and otherwise nothing. The second (r2) gives 
five million with the probability 0.10 and otherwise nothing.  Now, because ex-
cepted values of these prospects are E[s1] < E[r1] and E[s2] < E[r2], according to EUT 
formulation, the preference s1   r1 should entail the preference s2   r2, and vice 
versa. However, Allais expected that people might choose s1 in the first choice, 
because they are sure to become millionaires. Likewise, as the second choice they 
might opt for r2, because the probabilities of winning are similar, but the prizes 
are very different between s2 and r2. Allais’ conclusion was correct, because the 
above phenomenon has been observed in many experiments (e.g. Kahneman & 
Tversky 1979). The above example is the famous Allais paradox and is more gener-
ally known as the common consequence effect.
An interesting episode occurred in 1952, when Savage, who was a 
strong supporter of EUT, participated in a test organized by Allais.10 
It happened that Savage was one of those who chose as Allais expected. When 
Savage realized that his choices were contrary to EUT, he wanted to revise his 
choices. He claimed that he had been misled and a more cautious reading of the 
problem would have been sufficient to avoid the mistake.  
Common Ratio Effect. Another interesting phenomenon is the common ratio ef-
fect, which was also discovered by Allais. Suppose that we choose between two 
gambles. The first gamble gives 3000 € with certainty. The second one gives 4000 € 
with the probability 0.8 and otherwise nothing. After that, we once more choose 
between gambles such that the first one gives 3000 € with the probability 0.25, 
otherwise nothing, and the second one gives 4000 € with the probability 0.2, oth-
erwise nothing. The evidence from experiments suggests that most people select 
from the first choice the sure winning prize and from the second one they opt for 
4000 € (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky 1979).  However, this is inconsistent with EUT.
Other Problems and Paradoxes. During the last 50 years, other paradoxes have 
been found as well. One of these is a phenomenon called preference reversal. This 
was reported first by the psychologists Lichentestein & Slovic (1971) and it was 
later brought to the attention of economists by Grether & Plott (1979). Preference 
reversal is a behavioural tendency for the revealed preference ordering of a pair 
of alternatives to depend on the process used to elicit it. Another paradox is called 
10 See more by Gollier (2001).
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the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg 1961). Ellsberg showed that decision-makers could 
be influenced by extra information so that they changed their preferences from 
the certain case to the uncertain without a change in probabilities or in winning 
prizes. For more details on these problems and others, see for example Bardsley et 
al. (2010), Camerer (1995), Hargreaves et al. (1992), and Gärdenfors & Sahlin (1988).
2.4 ApologiA foR expeCTed uTiliTy TheoRy
Many new decision theories have emerged in response to the results of experi-
ments. Consequently, the new theories have challenged EUT. Do people really 
behave as EUT predicts, or can we explain behaviour by psychological aspects 
such as fear, enjoyment, disappointment, etc.? EUT has been defended against 
criticism. It has been argued that learning takes place in the real market environ-
ment that does not occur in experiments (e.g. Savage 1954). On the other hand, 
the learning process itself can be interesting (see Binmore 1999). 
However, regardless of the criticism, we can refer to the methodology of 
Lakatos. Since none of these alternative theories can explain all paradoxes, and 
because none of them is clearly better than EUT in general, we cannot refute 
EUT (Hausman 1992). On the other hand, it would not be reasonable to refute all 
alternative theories either. Hence many economists think that we have one core 
theory, in this case EUT, surrounded by alternative theories, which can explain 
exceptional phenomena conflicting with the EUT point of view (e.g. Plott 1995). 
As a result of discussion, some economists have perceived that it is meaningful 
to classify decision theories into different categories. 
Normative Theories. The purpose of normative theories is to express how peo-
ple should behave when confronting risky decisions. Thus the behavioural models 
based on EUT stress the rationality of decisions. We are not interested so much in 
how people behave in real life or in empirical experiments. 
Descriptive Theories. From the descriptive point of view, we are concerned with 
how people make decisions in real life. The starting point for these theories has 
been in empirical experiments, where it has been shown that people’s behaviour is 
inconsistent with the normative theories. These theories are, for example, prospect 
theory and regret theory. We present them in greater detail in the next sections.
2.5 deSCRipTive modelS
New descriptive theories have tried to explain paradoxes and decision making prob-
lems. Perhaps the best-known theories are the regret theory and the prospect theory. 
In fact, it seems that the prospect theory by Kahneman & Tversky (1979) really chal-
lenges EUT. 11However, there are also several other theories, for example, general-
11 A seminal work on prospect theory by Kahneman & Tversky (1979) is the second most cited paper 
in economics (Kim et al. 2006).
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ized expected utility theory (Machina 1982). For an extensive historical overview, 
see Starmer (2000). Next we briefly introduce regret theory and prospect theory.
2.5.1 Regret Theory
The descriptive regret theory omits the assumption of preference transitivity. The 
descriptive regret theory was proposed simultaneously by Bell (1982), Fishburn 
(1982), and Loomes & Sugden (1982, 1987). The main idea behind the theory is that, 
when making decisions individuals take into account not only the consequences that 
may result from the action chosen, but also how each consequence compares with 
what they would have experienced under the same state of the world had they chosen 
differently.  Thus the consequences are not independent of each other, and it is possi-
ble that choices are in contradiction with the transitivity assumption. However, peo-
ple maximize utility in the sense that they aspire to avoid regret or disappointment. 
For example, suppose an individual is gambling and buying insurance simul-
taneously. Thus, if an individual is globally risk averse or a risk lover, the behav-
iour is inconsistent with EUT. The regret theory explains the phenomenon in the 
following manner: Individuals buy insurance because they think that if they do 
not buy, the situation in case of an accident will be bad. Likewise, individuals also 
regret if they do not gamble for a small amount, because in case of winning, they 
might “lose” a huge prize. In conclusion, regret theory is based on comparison 
between “what is” and “what might have been”.
2.5.2 Prospect Theory
Prospect theory and cumulative prospect theory were first formulated by 
Kahneman & Tversky (1979) and Tversky & Kahneman (1992). They approached 
decision making under risk from the perspective of traditional behavioural sci-
ences. The findings by Kahneman & Tversky (1979) and Tversky & Kahneman 
(1981, 1986) in their experiments are the groundwork for prospect theory. The 
backbones of prospect theory and its main contrasts with EUT follow below.
Probability Weighting Function. The function can be described as follows: an indi-
vidual changes probabilities, which may be true probabilities, to his or her beliefs 
based on true probabilities, i.e. the probability weighting function weights true 
probabilities. In experiments it has been noted that people typically overestimate 
low probabilities and underestimate high probabilities (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). 
The point at which probabilities change from being overweighted to underweighted 
has often been estimated to be between 0.3 and 0.4 (see, e.g. Johnson 2004; Prelec 
1998). Figure 1 illustrates the shape of a typical probability weighting function.
Kahneman & Tversky (1979) used the first version of prospect theory, the probability 
weighting model, which violated the monotonicity assumption (see more, Prelec 1998). 
However, the rank-dependent representation, first developed by Quiggin (1982), avoids 
the problem of monotonicity.12 Moreover, Tversky & Kahneman (1992) used a version 
called cumulative prospect theory, or a cumulative weighting function, which was con-
sistent with the monotonicity assumption and which may differ for gains and losses. 
12 Actually, the rank-dependent utility model is EUT with the probability weighting.
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Figure 1. A Typical Probability Weighting Function.
Value Function. Another deviation with EUT is the properties of the value func-
tion. The value function assigns utilities to outcomes like EUT (utility function), 
but it has three main characteristics:
1) Defined on deviations from the reference point
2) Concave for gains and convex for losses
3) Steeper in the domain of losses.
Figure 2 illustrates these properties.
Figure 2. The Valuation of Outcomes in Prospect Theory.
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First, Kahneman & Tversky (1979) proposed that only consequences matter, 
not the wealth level. That is, the value function is defined on deviations from the 
reference point. Second, Kahneman & Tversky (1979) assumed that the function 
is concave above the reference point and convex below it. These properties reflect 
the principle of diminishing sensitivity. The impact of a marginal change will there-
fore decrease as we move further away from the reference point. For example, 
relative to the reference point the difference between a gain of 10 € and 20 € will 
seem larger than the difference between gains of 110 € and 120 €. Finally, they as-
sumed that value function is steeper for losses than for gains. This is the principle 
of loss aversion, which implies that losses loom larger than corresponding gains. 
We presented previously an example of an individual who buys insurance 
and gambles simultaneously. The prospect theory explains such behaviour in 
that an individual overestimates low probabilities and underweight high prob-
abilities. Thus simultaneous gambling and buying insurance are not necessarily 
incompatible.
2.6 uTiliTy of gAmBliNg
Descriptive models can explain gambling to some extent, but there are still some 
pitfalls, e.g. in prospect theory the loss-averse behaviour excludes some gaming 
types. Overall, it can also be argued that gambling is not wealth-oriented but 
rather motivated by the pleasure of gambling. The utility of gambling is most 
often ignored in the economic literature. This is surprising. One illustrative mo-
tivation for the utility of gambling is given by Conlisk (1993): 
“Economists do not model food preferences solely in terms of the nutritional consequences for health, 
or clothing preferences solely in terms of protection against the elements, or transportation preferences 
solely in terms of physical conveyance. Similarly, economists need not model gambling solely in terms 
of consequences for wealth.” (pp. 256). 
Furthermore, Conlisk (1993) proposed a model of the pleasure of gambling which 
was an expected utility model for a risk-averse bettor appended by “a tiny utility 
of gambling”13. Thus, gambling markets can be seen as entertainment or con-
sumption where bettors accept the negative expected value as a fee for enjoyment.
13 However, Conlisk (1993) noted that model could equally well be appended to models of risky choice 
other than the expected utility model.
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3 Market Efficiency
3.1. iNfoRmATioN effiCieNCy
In economics the term “efficiency” is used very often. Although efficiency has 
many meanings in different contexts, it refers to a situation in which it is not pos-
sible to increase the well-being of any one person without reducing the utility of 
another. This is usually known as Pareto Efficiency. However, in the analysis of 
betting markets, and financial markets more generally, the examination of effi-
ciency concerns the information dimension. The concept of information efficiency 
in a market is referred to as the so-called “efficient market hypothesis”. The most 
famous definition of efficient market hypothesis can be found in Fama (1991): 
“I take the market efficient hypothesis to be the simple statement that security prices fully reflect all 
available information.” (pp. 1575).
In other words, the observed market price reflects all relevant market information 
present and past and there are no systematic prediction errors14. Now, market ef-
ficiency can be categorized into three definitions: 1) weak form information is lim-
ited to the price history; 2) semi-strong information is limited to publicly available 
information; 3) strong form information includes all known relevant information, 
including private information.
In gambling markets, information plays a crucial role because the odds refer 
to the gambling market’s estimates of each outcome’s likelihood of winning15. 
Therefore, Thaler & Ziemba (1988) suggested that the efficient market hypothesis 
(ME) in the context of gambling markets can be presented as:
1. Weak ME: Do some systematic bets have positive expected value?
2. Strong ME:  Does every bet have the same expected value?
Weak form market efficiency detects the possibility to make a profit by using in-
formation on historical results. On the other hand, strong efficiency demands that 
every bet should have the same expected profit (or loss). In fact, these hypotheses 
are testable using betting market data16.
14 The efficient market hypothesis is usually misunderstood in economic debate: a hypothesis does not 
predict which final state will occur, it merely reflects on all the necessary information and proposes 
correct probabilities for the final specific states.
15 Especially in a pari-mutual system in which gamblers’ winning bets share the prize money from all bets 
and, therefore, the pool shares represent the odds for every possible outcome.
16 For a discussion of market efficiency from the perspective of gambling markets, see also Vaughan 
Williams (2005).
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3.2 iNeffiCieNCieS iN gAmBliNg mARkeTS
The best-known and well-documented inefficiency in gambling markets is the 
favourite-longshot bias (FLB): the favourites are under-bet while the longshots are 
over-bet (e.g. Ali 1977)17. As a result, if gamblers bet systematically on the fa-
vourites, they do not lose as much as gamblers who bet on the longshots. This 
may indicate that at least the strong efficiency condition is violated because the 
expected return is not a constant. Furthermore, it is possible that the favourite-
longshot bias is driven by behavioural aspects (e.g. risk-loving attitude or prob-
ability weighting).
However, efficiency test values may be contaminated by other types of inef-
ficiency. The End of the Day Effect is an interesting, although not extensively docu-
mented, regularity. At the end of the day, gamblers’ behaviour becomes more 
aggressive. In practice, this means that the favourite-longshot bias is especially 
strong in the last rounds of the game (see McGlothlin 1956; Ali 1977; Asch et 
al. 1982). This is consistent with the assumption of Prospect Theory that bettors 
are loss-averse and risk-loving below the reference point. Most bettors have lost 
during the game day and the last races offer an opportunity to win back their 
money. 
The Gambler’s Fallacy is an erroneous belief concerning the probability of an in-
dependent event when the event has recently occurred18. This is well documented 
in experiments and in real gambling markets as well. For instance, Clotfelter & 
Cook (1993) noted that in lottery gambling gamblers rarely chose the number 
which occurred in the previous round. Croson & Sundali (2005) conducted field 
experiments in casinos (roulette) and found evidence that supports the assump-
tion of the gambler’s fallacy.
Consequently, we can use gambling market data to test the assumptions of 
decision making theories (e.g. loss-averse behaviour or probability weighting) 
or the paradoxes from the experimental literature (e.g. the Allais Paradox or the 
gambler’s fallacy). Alternatively, we can find some other kind of regularities in 
gambling markets data that are unobserved in theory or experiments.
17 The bias was first noted by Griffith (1949).
18 There is also another fallacy that is very close to the gambler’s fallacy, namely the hot hand bias. That 
is, if an individual has won in the past, then whatever they choose to bet on is likely to win in the 
future.
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4 Summary of Articles
4.1 ChApTeR 2: pRiCe of gAmBliNg ANd BeTToRS’ 
BehAviouR oN uNfAiR gAmeS
The first essay (co-authored with Mikael Linden) is a description of risky and un-
certain decision making in the framework of gambling. Several reasons indicate 
that gambling behaviour is a consumption type activity, similar to enjoying a 
theatrical performance, for instance. Thus it is evident that gambling behaviour 
is more than just risky choices. 
We argue that it is reasonable to assume that the price of gambling is the 
take-out rate or the expected loss of a game. In theoretical studies, the utility of 
gambling has been modelled by two separate utility functions (e.g. Conlisk 1993). 
We propose an alternative approach, in which we avoid the additional utility 
function, and the price of gambling (the take-out rate) is taken into account as 
well. Nevertheless, we also show that even when the price of gambling is the ex-
pected loss, the risk-averse gambler with an unbiased perception of probabilities 
should never participate in such gambles that betting markets offer. In addition, 
we suggest that participation and typical gambling behaviour (e.g. betting on 
horse races) can be explained by an approach that includes the utility of risk, sub-
jective probability, and the utility of money. This is due to the fact that the gam-
bling markets constitute an environment where risky choices can be measured 
only by probabilities. We are aware that our approach needs more theoretical 
research and must be tested empirically. However, the approach may shed some 
interesting light on the literature on gambling markets.
4.2 ChApTeR 3: mARkeT effiCieNCy iN fiNNiSh hAR-
NeSS hoRSe RACiNg
The second essay is an empirical study of market efficiency in Finnish harness 
horse racing. The well-known inefficiencies reported in the literature are the fa-
vourite-longshot bias and the end of the day effect (e.g. Ali 1977; Asch et al. 1982). 
We also test the gambler’s fallacy assumption, usually reported in lotteries and 
Casino games (Clotfelter & Cook 1993; Croson & Sundali 2005). Although most 
horse racing studies are based on on-track betting information, our data also 
contains information that coincides with the transition from on-track gambling 
to Internet (off-track) betting19. It is possible that Internet gambling affects infor-
19 In fact, Internet betting on horse races has increased sharply since the early 2000s. For instance, during 
the years 2004 and 2005, Internet gambling increased by over 46 % (Yearbook of Finnish Gambling 2009).
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mation efficiency in gambling markets because it provides easier access to casual 
gambling.
We briefly first discuss definitions of market efficiency, and well-known inef-
ficiencies. Next we present the methods used to test betting market efficiency in 
the literature. We introduce a testing procedure which is based on the actual win-
ning odds rather than commonly used probability estimates. Consequently, the 
confidence intervals used to test the hypotheses differ from earlier approaches.
Our results imply that markets are weakly efficient but characterised by the 
favourite-longshot bias. That is, there is no opportunity to make any profits using 
past data. We also conclude that the transition from on-track betting to off-track, 
and especially to the Internet, does not remove the FLB. However, no meaningful 
evidence for other “anomalies”, namely the end of the day effect and the gambler’s 
fallacy, was found. This is a minor drawback for the prospect theory assump-
tion of loss-averse behaviour. In fact, consistent with the results in Snowberg 
& Wolfers (2010), if there was evidence of loss aversion in earlier data sets, it no 
longer appears in the more recent data. Thus, in our data, it is possible that this 
element has disappeared during the transition from on-track betting to off-track 
betting because gambling choices have no clear end point. Finally, the alternative 
procedure did not make any remarkable difference to the inferences made under 
standard methods because FLB is an obvious phenomenon regardless of the test-
ing method. However, the approach presented might be useful for smaller data 
sets or other areas of research.
4.3 ChApTeR 4: modelliNg BeTToRS’ RiSk BehAviouR 
iN hARNeSS hoRSe RACiNg: The uNCeRTAiNTy 
fuNCTioN AppRoACh
The third essay reports an empirical study based on the theoretical models of 
expected utility theory and non-expected utility theories. As noted earlier, gam-
bling markets (e.g. betting on horse races) are characterised by FLB. Explanations 
for FLB have been based on expected utility theory as well as on non-expected 
utility theories. The classical EUT explanation of FLB is that the bettors are risk-
lovers. On the other hand, for instance, prospect theory proposes that decision-
makers overweight the low probabilities and underweight the high ones, thereby 
arriving at FLB.
We test different specifications of probability weighting functions with a gen-
eral binary outcome model using Finnish harness horse racing data. This also 
allows testing of the implications of expected utility theory and non-expected 
utility theories. Overall, our empirical results suggest that bettors are risk-averse, 
but they also have unrealistic views regarding winning probabilities. These find-
ings are important because they reject the conclusion that risk-loving explains the 
bettors’ behaviour in racetrack betting. Furthermore, this implication is consistent 
with non-expected utility theories rather than with expected utility theory. 
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4.4 ChApTeR 5: doeS AllAiS pARAdox explAiN 
gAmBliNg BehAviouR? evideNCe fRom hoRSe RACe 
BeTTiNg
The fourth essay (co-authored with Jani Saastamoinen and Mikael Linden) analy-
ses empirical gambling markets data in the context of the results of experimental 
economics. Moreover, we test for the heterogeneity in the data that affects the risk 
behaviour. That is, the bettor’s behaviour may be conditional on different factors, 
such as time, place, and race characteristics. The theoretical approach is moti-
vated by the papers by Prelec (1998) and Diecidue et al. (2009), and the empirical 
testing is closely related to Jullien & Salanié (2000).
The criticism of EUT has been motivated by the experiments in which de-
cision-makers systematically violate the predictions of EUT (e.g. Allais 1953; 
Kahneman & Tversky 1979). However, it is not clear whatever these experiments 
reflect the real-life situations. In this paper we show that in real-life situations 
decision-makers behave under risk as proposed in the Allais experiments (Allais 
1953). More precisely, our empirical findings from gambling markets satisfy the 
preference relation of the common consequence effect and common ratio effect in 
the experimental literature over fifty years ago. Furthermore, our results suggest 
that bettors’ behaviour is invariant in time and in the scale of betting. In other 
words, all that matters is the attitude towards risk and uncertainty.
26
References
Ali, M. M. (1977) Probability and Utility Estimates for Racetrack Bettors. Journal of Political 
Economy 85, pp. 803 – 815
Allais, M. (1953) Le Comportement de l’Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Criticue des 
Postulats et Axiomes de l’Ecole Americaine. Econometrica 21, pp. 503 – 546
Asch, P., Malkiel, B. & R. E. Quandt (1982) Racetrack Betting and Informed Behavior. 
Journal of Financial Economics 10, pp. 187 – 194 
Bardsley, N., Cubitt, R., Loomes, G., Moffatt, P., Starmer, C. & R. Sugden (2010) Experimental 
Economics: Rethinking the Rules. Princeton University Press, USA
Bell, D.E. (1982) Regret in Decision Making under Uncertainty. Operations Research 20, pp. 
961 – 981
Bernoulli, D. (1738, original) (1954) Exposition on a New Theory on the Measurement of 
Risk. Econometrica 22, pp. 23 – 36
Binmore, K. (1999) Why Experiment in Economics? The Economic Journal 109, pp. 16 – 24 
Camerer, C. (1995) Individual Decision Making. In The Handbook of Experimental Economics 
(eds.) Kagel, J. H. & A. E. Roth, Princeton University Press, Princeton
Clotfelter, C. T. & P. J. Cook (1993) The “Gambler’s Fallacy” in Lottery Play. Management 
Science 39, pp. 1521 – 1525
Conlisk, J. (1993) The Utility of Gambling. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 6, pp. 255 – 275
Croson, R. & J. Sundali (2005) The Gambler’s Fallacy and Hot Hand: Empirical Data from 
Casinos. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 30 pp. 195 – 209
de Finetti, B. (1937) Its logical laws, its subjective sources. In Studies in Subjective Probability 
(eds.) Kyburg, H. E. & H. Smokler, John Wiley, New York
Diecidue E., Schmidt, U. & H. Zank (2009) Parametric weighting functions. Journal of 
Economic Theory 144, pp. 1102 – 1118
Ellsberg, D. (1961) Risk ambiguity, and the Savage axioms. Quarterly Journal of Economics 
75, pp. 643 – 669
Fama, E. F. (1991) Efficient Capital Markets: II. The Journal of Finance 5, pp. 1575 – 1617
Fishburn, P. C. (1982) Nontransitive measurable utility. Journal of Mathematical Psychology 
26, pp. 31 – 67
Friedman, M. & L. J. Savage (1948) The utility analysis of choices involving risks. Journal 
of Political Economy 56, pp. 279 – 304
Gollier, C. (2001) The Economics of Risk and Time. The MIT Press, USA
Grether, D. M. & C. R. Plott (1979) Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal 
Phenomenon. American Economic Review 69, pp. 623 – 638 
Griffith, R. M. (1949) Odds Adjustment by American Horse-Race Bettors. American Journal 
of Psychology 62, pp. 290 – 294 
Gärdenfors P. & N-E. Sahlin (eds.) (1988) Decision, Probability, and Utility. Cambridge 
University Press, USA
  27
Hargreaves H., Hollis M., Lyons B., Sugden R. & A. Weale (1992) The Theory of Choice. 
Blackwell, Oxford
Hausman, D. M. (1992) The inexact and separate science of economics. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge
Johnson, E. J. (2004) Rediscovering Risk. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 1, pp. 2 – 6 
Jullien, B. & B. Salanié (2000) Estimating Preferences Under Risk: The Case on Racetrack 
Bettors. Journal of Political Economy 108, pp. 503 – 530
Kahneman, D. & A. Tversky (1979) Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. 
Econometrica 47, pp. 263 – 291
Kim, E. H., Morse, A. & L. Zingales (2006) What Has Mattered to Economics Since 1970. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 4, pp. 189 – 202
Lichtenstein, S. & P. Slovic (1971) Reversals of Preference between Bids and Choices in 
Gambling Decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology 89, pp. 46 – 55
Loomes, G. & R. Sugden (1982) Regret Theory; An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice 
under Uncertainty. The Economic Journal 92, pp. 805 – 824
Loomes, G. & R. Sugden (1987) Some Implications of a More General Form of Regret 
Theory. Journal of Economic Theory 41, pp. 270 – 283
Machina, M. J. (1982) Expected Utility Theory without the Independence Axiom. 
Econometrica 50, pp. 277 – 323
Markowitz, H. (1952) The Utility of Wealth. Journal of Political Economy 60, pp. 151 – 158
McGlothlin, W. H. (1956) Stability of choices among uncertain alternatives. American 
Journal of Psychology 69, pp. 604 – 615
Plott, C. R. (1995) Comment to the article: Daniel Kahneman (1994) New Challenges to 
the Rationality Assumption. In The Rational Foundations of Economic Behaviour 
(eds.) (1996) Arrow, K. J., Colombatto E., Perlman M. & C. Schmidt, Macmillan, 
Hampshire 
Prelec, D (1998) The probability weighting function. Econometrica 60, pp. 497 – 528
Quiggin, J. (1982) A theory of anticipated utility. Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 3, pp. 323 – 343
Ramsey, F. P. (1931) Truth and Probability. In The Foundation of Mathematics and Other 
Logical Essays (eds.) Braithwaite R. B., Routledge, London
Savage, L. J. (1954) The Foundations of Statistics. John Wiley, New York
Snowberg, E. & J. Wolfers (2010) Explaining the Favorite-Longshot Bias: Is it Risk-Love or 
Misperceptions? Journal of Political Economy 118, pp. 723 – 746
Starmer, C. (2000) Developments in Non-Expected Utility Theory: The Hunt for a 
Descriptive Theory of Choice under Risk. Journal of Economic Literature 38, pp. 332 
– 382
Thaler, R. H. & W. T. Ziemba (1988) Anomalies – Parimutuel Betting Markets, Racetracks 
and Lotteries. Journal of Economic Perspectives 2, pp. 161 – 174
Tversky, A. & D. Kahneman (1981) The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice. 
Science 211, pp. 453 – 458
Tversky, A. & D. Kahneman (1986) Rational Choice and Framing Decisions. Journal of 
Business 59, pp. 251 – 277
28
Tversky A. & D. Kahneman (1992) Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation 
of Uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5, pp. 297 – 323
Vaughan Williams, L. (eds.) (2005) Information Efficiency in Financial and Betting Markets. 
Cambridge University Press, New York
Virén, M. (eds.) (2008) Gaming in the New Market Environment. Palgrave Macmillan, London
von Neumann, J. & O. Morgenstern (1944) The Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton
Yearbook of Finnish Gambling 2009 (in Finnish) (2010) The National Institute for Health 
and Welfare, Helsinki
  29
30
Articles
Suhonen, N. & M. Linden (2010): Price of Gambling and Bettors´Behaviour on 
Unfair Games. This is a revised version of the article published in Journal of 
Gambling Business and Economics 2, 2010.
Suhonen, N. (2011): Market Efficiency in Finnish Harness Horse Racing. Finnish 
Economic Papers 1, pp. 55–63. Reprinted with kind permission by Finnish Economic 
Association.
Suhonen, N. : Modelling Bettors´Risk Behaviour in Harness Horse Racing: The 
Uncertainty Function Approach. Unpublished manuscript.
Suhonen, N., Saastamoinen, J. & M. Linden: Does Allain Paradox Explain 
Gambling Behaviour? Evidence From Horse Race Betting. Unpublished manu-
script.
